



















This paper investigates the role of dollarization in the dynamics of inflation in Turkey.  Descriptive 
analysis suggests that, in addition to high inflation and economic instability, institutional factors also 
played an important role in the evolution of dollarization in Turkey. The empirical findings 
corroborate the importance of dollarization in the dynamics of inflation.  The results suggest that 
shocks to dollarization initially lead to a decline in the monetary base as the public switches from 
domestic to foreign money holdings.  However, the monetary base increases later on to generate the 
required inflation tax for a given budget deficit.   The findings also indicate that the fiscal authority 
tries to compensate part of the decline in inflation tax through raising administered prices.  As 
expected, the exchange rate responds positively to shocks to dollarization owing to the high elasticity 
of substitution between domestic and foreign currency.   
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 I. Introduction 
High and volatile inflation has been one of the salient features of the Turkish economy 
since the 1970s.  Evolution of inflation in Turkey differs from other high inflation episodes in 
one important respect.  Contrary to many other high inflation episodes, high persistent 
inflation in Turkey never spiraled into hyperinflation.  This, coupled with macroeconomic 
instability and failed stabilization efforts, in turn, led to one of the highest dollarized 
economies where, by the end of 2001, foreign currency deposits accounted for roughly 60 
percent of total deposits (Table 1).   
The high level of foreign currency deposits in Turkey raises questions concerning the 
design, implementation and effectiveness of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. 
Existing studies
1 show that dollarization: (i) reduces the yield of the inflation tax and results 
in higher and more volatile inflation, for a given level of budget deficit (Nicholas 1974, 
Rojas-Suarez 1992);
2 (ii) reduces the monetary authorities’ control over domestic liquidity 
both by increasing the component over which little direct influence can be exerted and by 
rendering money demand less stable (IMF 2000); (iii) affects the choice of exchange rate 
regime (Berg and Borensztein 2000);
3 and (iv) increases the exposure of the banking system 
to additional risks on account of uncovered foreign liabilities.
4 
Although the phenomenon of dollarization raises many questions, investigations of 
policy alternatives offer few clear-cut solutions.  The lack of simple policy answers is 
attributed to, inter alia, two factors.
5 First, the analytical work in this area has not been able to 
produce clear guidance in many important issues.  Second, at the empirical level the absence 
                                                 
1 See Calvo and Vegh (1992) for a comprehensive review of the relevant literature. 
2 In the presence of a high elasticity of substitution, dollarization is also likely to render the exchange rate extremely volatile 
in response to policy changes and credibility problems (McNelis and Asilis 1992). 
3 More specifically, Berg and Borensztein (2000) show that a high degree of currency substitution argues for a more fixed 
exchange rate regime, while asset substitution may imply either more rigid or more flexible regimes may be appropriate. 
4 It is also argued that a nominal devaluation will drastically increase the burden faced by debtors and can generate a wave of 
corporate bankruptcies. This may, in turn, result in a banking crisis, as banks see their stock of non-performing loans rise. 
Calvo (1999) also supports this conjecture and claims that “liability-dollarized economies are highly vulnerable to a 
devaluation”. 
5 See Calvo and Vegh (1992) for more on this. 
  2of data on the stock of foreign currency circulating in the economy has emerged as a serious 
hindrance.  As a consequence, empirical studies can only investigate the importance of 
dollarization (foreign currency as a store of value) but not necessarily currency substitution 
(foreign currency as a medium of exchange).    
The distinction between medium of exchange substitutability and store of value 
substitutability is also important in assessing the stages of the dollarization process.  In this 
respect, casual evidence suggests that in high-inflation countries foreign currency is used 
initially as a store of value or unit of account, and only later as a medium exchange. As such, 
currency substitution can be viewed as the last stage of the dollarization process.
6  
 
Table 1: Evolution of the Dollarization in Selected Countries
a 
Source: CBRT and Honohan and Shi (2002) a: FX deposits as a percentage of total deposits (end-year). 
   Argentina Croatia Czech  Republic  Mexico Peru Poland Romania Russia Slovakia Turkey
1990  47.2   -  -  13 48.7  - 3.6  -  -  25.5
1991  48.1   -  -  13.6 65.1  - 4.7  -  -  33.6
1992  47.1   -  -  11.1 66.8  - 20.4  -  -  38.6
1993  52.2   - 8.9  12.7 66.4 29.6 37.9 39.9 12.5  44.3
1994  55.5 59.3 7.8  18.9 67.2 33.9 27.9 39.2 14.2 51.7
1995  57.4 66.6 5.9  19.6 65 25.1 27.6 28.3 12.5  53.0
1996  56.4 67.6 6.7  20.1 68 20.9 28.4 27.4 11.4  48.5
1997  57.2 68.9 12.7  14.2 58.9 20.7 33.4 24.6 11.8 50.4
1998  58.2 73.7 12.7  17.1 58.5 17.7 37.3 51.2 16.4 46.7
1999  62.3 71.6 13.3  17.2 49.3 17.6 43.2 48.8 15.9 45.9
2000   -  73 13.3  17 48.5 16.5 47 48.5 16.3  45.3
2001   -  73 13.5    47 17.9 49.3 46.8  16.4  57.6
Although several studies have investigated the dynamics of inflation in Turkey, to the 
best of our knowledge, existing empirical work has not explored the role of dollarization in 
the inflation process.  This paper attempts to fill this void in the literature on Turkey by 
empirically investigating the importance of dollarization in the dynamics of inflation.  The 
investigation also attempts to provide a brief descriptive analysis of the main macroeconomic 
and institutional factors affecting the evolution of the dollarization process in Turkey. 
                                                 
6 Throughout this paper, Turkey’s experience of increasing holdings of foreign currency deposits is being referred to as 
dollarization. 
  3The principal conclusions that emerge from our study corroborate the importance of 
dollarization in the dynamics of inflation in Turkey.  The empirical findings suggest that 
shocks to dollarization lead to a decline in the monetary base as the public switches from 
domestic to foreign money holdings.  However, the monetary base increases after 5 months to 
generate the required inflation tax for a given budget deficit.   The results also indicate that 
the fiscal authority tries to compensate part of the decline in inflation tax through raising 
administered prices.  As expected, the exchange rate responds positively to shocks to 
dollarization owing to the high elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
currency. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the main macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting the dollarization 
process in Turkey. Section 3 discusses the dynamics of inflation in Turkey and presents the 
empirical results.  Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.  A Cursory Look at the Evolution of Dollarization in Turkey 
Dollarization reflects economic agents’ efforts to protect the value of their wealth and 
income, in the context of deteriorating financial conditions, that have an adverse effect on the 
expected return of domestic money holdings relative to those on foreign balance, as well as in 
response to changes in institutional, political and external factors that influence expectations 
regarding the liquidity of domestic versus foreign currency denominated assets. 
In this respect, the following subsections will highlight the key macroeconomic and 
institutional factors that contributed to the steady rise in dollarization in the Turkish economy 




  42.1 Macroeconomic Factors Affecting the Dollarization Process 
Since the introduction of foreign currency deposits in Turkey in December 1983, 
dollarization has increased significantly, owing to high and volatile rates of inflation and a 
depreciating exchange rate (Figures 1 and 2). In addition to these factors, unsuccessful 
stabilization efforts, financial crises, and under-developed capital markets played an important 
role in the rise in dollarization. 
Particularly, in the aftermath of the 1994 financial crisis that resulted in a substantial 
devaluation of the Turkish lira, economic agents became more concerned with unexpected 
increases in inflation and devaluations as evidenced by the prominent shift in their portfolio 
composition. The collapse of the exchange rate based stabilization program in February 2001 
further promoted this upward trend in dollarization. 
Figure 1  Figure 2 









































































Coef. of Var. of Real TRL/USD Rate (Right Axis)
FX Dep./M2Y
 



































































The share of FX deposits in broad money supply (M2Y)—one of the most widely used 
indicators of dollarization—reached its peak of 59.5 percent in October 2001, from 12.8 
percent in 1986.
7  During the 2000 exchange rate based stabilization program, however, there 
was a reduction in FX deposits both in USD terms and as a share of M2Y, reflecting 
economic agents’ confidence in the program.  Nonetheless, the process of de-dollarization 
                                                 
7 M2Y = M2 + FX Deposits, where M1= Currency in Circulation + Demand Deposits and M2= M1 + Time Deposits 
  5was short-lived.  The collapse of the exchange-rate-based stabilization program in February 
2001 led to a surge in foreign currency deposits, which continued to rise, reaching roughly 58 
percent of all deposits by the end-December 2001.
 8 
If we include the Turkish residents (non-banking) deposits abroad—using the data 
reported by the BIS—as part of foreign currency holdings of the private sector, this new ratio, 
which increased from 16.7 percent in 1986 to 63.8 in 2001, shows a similar pattern with a 
slightly steeper upward trend compared to FX/M2Y (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3  Figure 4 
Dollarization in Turkey: Share of


















































































































































































































































The increasing share of foreign exchange credits in total credits emerges as an 
additional indicator of the rise in dollarization.  This ratio would also capture the financial 
system’s exposure to systemic risk in the case of large devaluations.  Although there was a 
shift in the composition of loans in favor of foreign exchange loans after the 1994 financial 
crisis, the share of foreign currency lending in the total declined noticeably during the 
exchange-rate-based stabilization program in 2000 (Figure 5).  The decline in FX lending, 
however, coincided with the sharp increase in banks’ open positions.  This observation, in 
turn, corroborates the notion that pegged exchange rates provide implicit guarantees for those 
                                                 
8 In USD terms, FX deposits rose to USD 40.8 billion.  
  6looking to borrow in foreign currency, thereby giving rise to a moral hazard problem 
(Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999).  
 
Figure 5  Figure 6 

























































































































































Casual evidence suggests that the excess return on Turkish lira deposits over foreign 
currency deposits also played an important role in the dollarization process.  A quick glance at 
the FX/M2Y ratio and the difference between the interest rate on Turkish lira deposits and FX 
deposits corrected for changes in the exchange rate indicates that the periods of high 
dollarization tend to be associated with negative excess returns on Turkish lira deposits (Figure 
7). 
Figure 7 
3 Month TL-FX Deposit Rates Differential in USD Terms 





















































































FX Dep./M2Y (left) TL Rate- FX Rate(USD)
 
  7Changes in the composition of deposits can also shed some light on the evolution of 
the function of domestic money over time.  An interesting observation in this respect is the 
sharp decline in TL denominated time deposits with 6-12 months maturity (Table 2).  TL 
deposits with 1-3 months maturity, however, display a noticeable upward trend during the 
time under consideration.  In the case of foreign currency deposits, this pattern appears to be 
much less prominent.  This observation, in turn, confirms the decline in the use of TL at the 
level of store of value. 
 
Table 2. Composition of Bank Deposits (percentages) 
  Turkish Lira Deposits  Foreign Exchange Deposits 
   Time Deposits  Time Deposits 
  
Demand 
Deposits  1-3 months 6-12 months
Demand 
Deposits  1-3 months 6-12 months 
1990  36.5 46.2 53.8 24.3 46.6 53.4 
1991  31.6 47.1 52.9 21.7 44.5 55.5 
1992  33.1 49.0 51.0 23.4 46.0 54.0 
1993  36.6 51.2 48.8 26.6 47.6 52.4 
1994  27.3 53.4 46.6 28.8 49.1 50.9 
1995  21.4 54.9 45.1 29.1 48.5 51.5 
1996  27.0 56.4 43.6 26.9 48.7 51.3 
1997  23.3 58.1 41.9 23.3 48.3 51.7 
1998  17.4 60.2 39.8 21.3 49.3 50.7 
1999  17.2 61.5 38.5 17.7 49.9 50.1 
2000  20.6 62.4 37.6 15.4 51.7 48.3 
2001  19.9 62.9 37.1 18.2 51.9 48.1 
Source: CBRT 
In recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the February 2001 crisis, the share of 
government securities in foreign currency or indexed to foreign currency in the total has 
increased substantially (Figure 8). The share of government securities denominated in foreign 
currency or indexed to foreign currency in total domestic debt rose to 36 percent in 2001 from 
8 percent in 2000.  This development, in turn, not only makes the fiscal position more 
sensitive to exchange rate changes, but also further increases the degree of dollarization in the 
economy. 
 
  8Figure 8  Figure 9 
The Share of FX linked/ denominated Debt Instruments in 
Total Domestic Debt Stock 
FX Funds Raised by Special Finance Houses
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Finally, evidence suggests that Special Finance Houses (SFHs)—a form of non-bank 
financial institutions—also played an important role in the dollarization process in Turkey. 
Between 1995 and 2000 foreign exchange funds raised by special finance houses displayed a 
steep upward trend (Figure 9).
9 In 2001, the Bank Restructuring and Supervision Agency 
closed the largest special finance house, which led to a decline in funds raised by SFHs by 
USD 1 billon. 
 
2.2 Institutional Factors Affecting the Dollarization Process 
In addition to the macroeconomic environment, institutional factors and agents’ 
expectations of future political developments play a crucial role in the process of 
dollarization.  Evidence suggests that dollarization is likely to proceed more rapidly in 
countries with poorly developed capital markets and limited outlets for domestic investments, 
in economies where there are formalized and secure channels for holding foreign currency—
i.e., foreign currency bank deposits—and where there are fewer regulations on the types of 
                                                 
9  Institutions engaged in Islamic banking constitute a significant portion of special financial houses.  Clients of these 
institutions tend to hold their savings in foreign currency in lieu of TL denominated interest earning deposits or other interest 
earning instruments. 
  9transactions that can legally be financed.  Moreover, the greater the uncertainty regarding 
future political developments, the greater the agents’ incentive to hold foreign currency. 
In this context, Turkey’s experience with the dollarization process was not 
significantly different from other dollarization episodes.
10  The noticeable increase in foreign 
currency deposits since the mid-1980s took place in the context of the liberalization of the 
financial system and the emergence of new financial instruments along with the capital 
account liberalization (Box 1).  The degree of dollarization in Turkey appears to have 
increased especially after: (i) residents were allowed to hold FX deposits; (ii) transactions in 















































































































































Residents were allowed to hold FX 
deposits (1984)
FX trans. were set free, capital 
account was  liberalized (1989)
 
 
  In addition to the above-mentioned institutional factors, policy decisions regarding 
reserve requirements, withholding tax rates, and resource utilization deductions also played 








                                                 
10 See Savastano (1992) for the role of institutional factors in the process of dollarization in the case of Bolivia, Mexico, 
Peru, and Uruguay. 
  10Box: 1 The Financial Liberalization in Turkey 
 
Turkish experience of financial liberalization began along with the structural adjustment 
program initiated in 1980, under the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
At the beginning of the stabilization program, interest rate ceilings on loans and deposits were lifted. 
In the credit market, the Central Bank’s control over commercial banks was simplified with a revision 
of the liquidity and reserve requirement system for deposits. An interbank money market for short-
term borrowing facilities was enacted in 1986. In 1987, the Central Bank diversified its monetary 
policy instruments by starting open market operations. In order to regulate and supervise the capital 
market, a regulatory body (the Capital Market Board) was established. The Istanbul Stock Exchange 
was reopened in 1986. 
 
The liberalization of the exchange rate regime began in 1981. To this end, the practice of 
setting and announcing nominal foreign currency rates daily by the Central Bank began in May 1981. 
With the passage of Decree no. 30 in July 1984, the second step in the liberalization of the foreign 
exchange regime took place. The most important provisions of the Decree no. 30 were: (i) allowing 
foreign residents to invest in Turkish lira denominated securities, and repatriate profits freely; (ii) 
letting the Turkish citizens to have foreign currency denominated deposits with the domestic banks; 
and (iii) allowing the domestic banks to extend FX loans and borrow from international financial 
markets. 
 
The final step in liberalizing the FX regime and international capital movements occurred with 
the passage of the Decree no. 32 (on the Law of Protection of the Value of the Turkish Lira) in August 
1989, and Decree amending Decree no. 32 in February 1990. The latter two Decrees completed, to a 
large extent, the liberalization of the FX regime and international capital movements: (i)commercial 
banks, Islamic Financial Institutions and authorized foreign currency brokers were allowed to 
determine freely the FX rates in their transactions; (ii) limitations on the amount of FX denominated 
assets to be owned by the private domestic investors were lifted; and (iii) limitations on the domestic 
banks’ borrowing from international financial markets were lifted. Furthermore, foreign residents were 
allowed to buy or sell company stocks (quoted on the Istanbul Stock Exchange) and government 
securities. The restrictions over the transfer of profits abroad by foreign investors were also abolished. 
 
Central Bank imposed reserve requirements for foreign exchange deposits in end-
1985.  During the period 1985-1990, the reserve requirement ratio on FX deposits varied 
between 15 to 25 percent.  By 1996, this ratio declined to 11 percent and remained at that 
level thereafter.  It is argued that imposition of a high reserve requirement on foreign currency 
deposits can be considered as a policy tool to discourage the use of foreign currencies.  In the 
context of the Turkish experience, it appears that the downward trend in FX reserve 
requirement ratios after the 1990s coincides with the steady rise in dollarization.  However, 
the fact that the reserve requirement ratios on FX deposits were generally kept higher than 
those on domestic currency deposits (Figure 11), not surprisingly, suggests that this policy 
alone cannot be an effective policy tool in discouraging the use of foreign currency.   
 
  11Figure 11 
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Since the end of 1990, FX reserve 
requirements generally reduced.   
 
 
The withholding tax rates on interest income from FX deposits, which stayed at 10 
percent between 1988 and 1996, were increased gradually in the 1997-2001 period.  In 2001, 
the tax rate for FX deposits with less than one-year maturity and more than one-year maturity, 
increased to 18 percent and 16 percent, respectively.
11  As a result of the high premium on the 
TL denominated deposits, the nominal interest income obtained from TL deposits is greater 
than that of foreign exchange deposits. Therefore, holding foreign exchange deposits instead 
of Turkish lira deposits would lead to a lower amount of withholding tax.
12  In addition, 
changes in the principal of the foreign currency deposit in terms of TL, which often arises 
from the appreciation of the foreign currency, are not subject to taxation.  This, in turn, 
renders TL deposits less attractive compared to foreign exchange deposits. 
The Resource Utilization Support Fund (RUSF) deduction, which was introduced in 
1985, initially applied to foreign exchange loans extended by banks.  The RUSF deduction 
applies to lending rates and the borrowers pay the deductions. However, the RUSF deduction 
concerning the foreign credits used by the banks and residents from abroad applies to the 
quantity of the loan. Casual evidence suggests that the RUSF deductions were somehow 
                                                 
11 Tax rates on TL and FX deposit rates did not differ significantly since 1988. 
12 For example, let us assume that the exchange rate is 1TL=1USD and the respective interest rates on the TL and USD 
denominated deposits are 50 percent and 4 percent.  In the case of a TL100 deposit, assuming that the withholding tax rate is 
20 percent, the amount of withholding tax will be TL10.  In the case of a USD 100 deposit, assuming that the exchange rate 
depreciates (1TL= 0.5 USD) and that the withholding tax rate is 20 percent, the amount of withholding tax will be TL 1.6. 
  12effective in rendering banks’ foreign exchange borrowings from abroad less attractive (Figure 
11). 
   
Figure 11 








































































RUSF ratio on foreign credit 
was in force (1995-1998)
 
 
3. The Dynamics of Inflation in Turkey 
The Turkish economy has been undergoing high and chronic inflation since the 1970s. 
Indeed, starting from the 1970s, the inflation rate displayed an upward trend and reached its 
peak of 120 percent in 1994 in the aftermath of an exchange market crisis.
13  The evolution of 
inflation in Turkey can be divided into three sub-periods: (i) the period during which price 
developments were influenced by the financial liberalization and the deteriorating current 
account outlook (1989-1993); (ii) the 1994 currency crisis and worsening debt dynamics 
(1995-1999); and (iii) the exchange-rate based stabilization program and its collapse (2000-
2001). 
Between 1989 and 1993, prior to the 1994 crisis, inflation rate hovered around 60 
percent. After the 1994 crisis, the inflation rate moved to an upper plateau in the 80 percent 
                                                 
13 For a more extensive discussion of the studies on inflation in Turkey see Hoon and Papi (1997) and references therein.  
See also Akat (2000) for an overview of the political economy of inflation in Turkey.  
  13range.  Inflation began to move towards the 60 percent range at the outset of 1998 due mainly 
to the fiscal retrenchment along with the sharp contraction in economic activity.
14 
 
Table 3. Evolution of the Inflation Rate in Selected Emerging Market Economies
a 
   1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2000  2001
Turkey 46.3 79.3 74.1 54.9  54.4
Israel 118.3 12.9 6.4 1.1  2.9
South Africa  14.7 11.3 6.5 4.5  5.7
Korea 6.4 6.2 4.0 2.3  4.1
Malaysia 3.2 4.3 3.1 1.3  1.4
Thailand 4.4 4.8 4.3 1.5  1.7
Hungary 10.9 25.4 15.1 9.7  9.2
Chile 20.4 13.9 5.2 3.8  3.6
Mexico 69.1 18.0 19.4 9.5  6.4
a: IMF WEO (2002) and the CBRT. 
 
  In an attempt to stabilize the Turkish economy plagued by the chronic high inflation 
and real interest rates as well as deteriorating debt dynamics, the authorities launched an 
exchange rate based stabilization program in January 2000.  The program also included some 
heterodox measures in the context of public prices and new rent regulations in the housing 
sector in line with the targeted inflation rate with an objective to reduce consumer price 
inflation to 25 percent by the end of 2000.  
Although there was some success in reducing inflation—the CPI inflation declined to 
33.4 percent on an annual basis by February 2001—weaknesses in the banking system, the 
severe terms of trade shock along with the deterioration of the macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
all contributed to the collapse of the program.  As a result, a floating exchange rate regime 
was adopted on February 22, 2001. 
  In high inflationary countries like Turkey the question of why prices increase lies at 
the heart of the debate over which policies should be adopted to stabilize the price level.  The 
notion that inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon is widely accepted.  There is strong 
                                                 
14 See the Inflation Report published by the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) in July 2000 for more on this. 
  14evidence that in the medium and long term, there exists a very close correlation between the 
rate of growth of monetary aggregates and inflation, after changes in output and velocity are 
taken into consideration.  This correlation has been corroborated both in the international
15 
and Turkish experiences (Figure 12). 
  
Figure 12 












At first blush, the above discussion might suggest that it would be relatively 
straightforward for the central bank to eliminate inflation in light of its influence on the 
behavior of monetary aggregates, the monetary base in particular.  Needless to say, however, 
the close correlation between money and prices does not reveal anything about the direction 
of causality.
16 
  In this respect, consistent with the experience of other countries with high-inflation 
episodes—i.e., Mexico and Brazil—recent empirical evidence on Turkey suggests that 
exogenous movements to monetary base have not been a cause of inflationary pressures in 
                                                 
15 See for instance Lucas (1996). 
16 In fact, the results of Granger Causality tests show that the causality runs from prices to base money (Monetary Policy 
Report published by the CBRT in April 2002). 
  15Turkey.
17  The empirical findings show that that inflationary pressures in Turkey have their 
origin in the following factors: (i) the presence of external shocks which engender sharp 
exchange rate depreciations; (ii) changes in public sector prices; and (iii) inflationary inertia.
18 
 
3.1 Empirical Analysis and Results  
In spite of the high level of dollarization in Turkey, to the best of our knowledge, there 
has not been any empirical study investigating the effects of dollarization on the dynamics of 
inflation.
19  Evidence suggests that the presence of high dollarization could affect the 
inflationary dynamics through several channels.  More specifically, it is argued that 
dollarization: (i) aggravates the resulting inflation rate for a given fiscal deficit (Nicholas 
1974 and Rojas-Suarez 1992);
20 (ii) increases the volatility of inflation for a given budget 
deficit (McNelis and Asilis 1992); (iii) coupled with a high degree of currency substitution 
renders the exchange rate not only more volatile, but also more responsive to credibility issues 
(Akçay et. al. 1997). 
It should be noted that the above highlighted channels do not suggest that dollarization 
is the cause of inflation.  By contrast, dollarization is usually an endogenous response of 
economic agents to economic instability and high inflation.  As a consequence, the presence 
of dollarization should be viewed as a channel through which fiscal and monetary policies 
influence the evolution of inflation. 
                                                 
17
 See the Monetary Policy Report published by the CBRT in April 2002.  Existing studies, see for instance, Lim and Papi 
(1997), Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan (1999), Özcan et. al. (2001), tend to agree upon the importance of the inertia and the 
exchange rate.  However, there seems to be a disagreement over the importance of monetary variables. 
18 The above underscored indirect transmission channel through which shocks to exchange rates and public prices can 
influence inflation expectations in Turkey can be illustrated by the following example.  Let us assume that the central bank 
faces an exogenous shock in the form of unanticipated adjustments to public sector goods prices that are not compatible with 
the central bank’s inflation target.  In turn, this will generate a higher CPI, thereby raising nominal demand for money.  If the 
central bank increases the supply of base money to match the increase in demand, the central bank would have 
accommodated the rise in money demand engendered by an exogenous shock to prices caused by the increase in public 
prices. Under normal circumstances, this would be described as once for all adjustment in the price level, which should not 
create further problems for the central bank.  However, given Turkey’s history of high inflation, the dynamics triggered by 
the increase in public prices are complicated as the public might revise their inflationary expectations upwards, which would 
lead to increases in wages and non-tradeable goods prices, and thus bringing about inflation and monetary base growth. 
19 Selçuk (2001), Akçay et. al. (1997), and Selçuk 1997) investigated different aspects of the consequences of dollarization in 
Turkey. 
20 This channel becomes more prominent as the inflation rate rises since economic agents adjust their portfolio more swiftly. 
  16  This section—drawing upon the dynamics outlined in the previous section—
investigates the importance of dollarization in the dynamics of inflation in Turkey.
21  To this 
end, we employ a vector autoregression (VAR) model that incorporates, as its endogenous 
variables: CPI (P), base money (MB), exchange rate (EX), dollarization ratio (FX/M2Y) and 
public sector prices (PSP).
22  
We follow a recent paper by Peseran and Shin (1998), which proposes an alternative 
approach to widely used orthogonalized impulse response analysis.  Unlike the traditional 
impulse response analysis, this approach—referred to as generalized impulse response 
analysis—does not require orthogonalization of shocks and is invariant to the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR.  We also employ this approach to construct order-invariant forecast 
error variance decompositions. 
  More specifically, the generalized impulse responses are invariant to the re-ordering of 
the variables, but this is not the case with the orthogonalized ones.  Typically, there are many 
alternative re-parameterizations that could be employed to compute orthogonalized impulse 
responses, and there is no clear guidance as to which one of these possible parameterizations 
should be used.  In contrast, the generalized impulse responses are unique and fully take 
account of the historical patterns of correlations observed amongst the different shocks.
23 
We begin our empirical investigation by testing for the order of the VAR using several 
information criteria.  Based on the overall results of these tests reported in Table 4, the 
optimal lag length was determined to be 2.
  




21 It should be noted that our approach is quite similar to the one outlined in the Monetary Policy Report of the CBRT issued 
in April 2002 and to the ones employed for other comparable emerging market economies (see, for instance, Carstens and 
Werner (1999) as a reference for the Mexican experience). 
22 All data are obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey and the State Institute of Statistics. 
23 For instance, structural VAR (SVAR) approach attempts to identify the impulse responses by imposing a priori restrictions 
on the covariance matrix of the structural errors and the contemporaneous and/or long-run impulse responses to themselves.  
The restrictions include requiring certain shocks to have zero long-run impacts, or by assuming contemporaneous effects of 
certain other shocks to be zero on certain variables.  Under this approach, it is assumed that the structural (or economic) 
errors are uncorrelated, which may not be reasonable in many macro-econometric applications of SVAR methodology.  In 
addition, while this approach can be used in very small systems, the number of restrictions required grows rapidly with the 
number of endogenous variables in the system, making it non-feasible in larger systems. 
  17Table 4. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag LogL  LR  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
0 242.201205  NA    1.89E-08 -3.593958  -3.484761  -3.549585 
1 1303.516111  2026.147000  2.87E-15 -19.295700  -18.640520  -19.02946 
2 1371.332110  124.329300  1.50E-15*  -19.94443*  -18.74326*  -19.45633* 
3 1395.634845  42.713900 1.52E-15 -19.933860  -18.186710  -19.2239 
4 1420.030646  41.02930* 1.55E-15 -19.924710  -17.631570  -18.99288 
5 1438.129579  29.067980 1.74E-15 -19.820150  -16.981020  -18.66646 
6 1452.873953  22.563360 2.07E-15 -19.664760  -16.279650  -18.2892 
7 1471.959696  27.761080 2.33E-15 -19.575150  -15.644050  -17.97773 
8 1492.309845  28.058540 2.59E-15 -19.504690  -15.027620  -17.68542 
9 1511.344635  24.802910 2.97E-15 -19.414310  -14.391250  -17.37317 
10 1534.83607  28.83039  3.22E-15  -19.39146 -13.82241 -17.12845 
11 1558.70655  27.48723  3.53E-15  -19.37434 -13.25931 -16.88947 
12 1582.09375  25.15895  3.97E-15  -19.34991 -12.68889 -16.64317 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level). 
FPE: Final prediction error. 
AIC: Akaike information criterion. 
SC: Schwarz information criterion. 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
 
The VARs are estimated using monthly data from January 1990 through December 
2001.  The estimated VAR coefficients are not in themselves very interesting and thus are 
omitted.  Instead, we focus on the impulse responses and the variance decompositions.
24   
Figure 13 plots the impulse responses of CPI (P) monetary base (MB), the exchange 
rate (EX), public prices (PSP), and the dollarization ratio (FX/M2Y) with respect to 
innovations in FX/M2Y over a horizon of 36 months.
25 Standard errors are calculated by the 
Monte Carlo method, with 1,000 repetitions (of ±  2 standard deviations).
26  
                                                 
24 In the estimations, we included two dummy variables to account for the impact of the 1994 and 2001 crises. The VAR 
stability condition check suggests that the model satisfies the stability condition.  Also, we included a linear time trend in the 
estimations. The results of this exercise suggest that the empirical findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of a linear time 
trend.    
25 There is an issue of whether the variables in a VAR need to be stationary.  Sims (1980) and others recommend against 
differencing even if the variables contain unit roots.  He contends that the goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the 
interrelationships among the variables, not to determine estimates.  The main argument against differencing is that it “throws 
away” information concerning the co-movements in the data.  Following  the argument put forth above, variables are not 
differenced.  By not imposing co-integrating relations, the estimation avoids a long-run identification problem, which may be 
in principle difficult to solve, with no loss of information on the long-run properties of the system, incurring some loss due to 
the reduced efficiency of estimation but at no cost in terms of consistency of estimators.  See Sims et al. (1990) for more on 
this. 
26 Monte Carlo standard errors are computed as follows. At each repetition, a random sample from the asymptotic 
distribution of the VAR coefficients is drawn. The asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficients is given in Hamilton 
(1994). From these simulated coefficients, the impulse response functions are computed. After repeating this process 1000 
times, the 95% confidence interval, by the percentile method, is constructed. The standard errors reported are the standard 
deviations of the simulated impulse responses across 1,000 replications. 
  18Impulse responses suggest that shocks in FX/M2Y have a positive impact on P, EX, 
and PSP.
27 While innovations in FX/M2Y have a negative effect on MB for the first 5 
months, they affect MB positively thereafter.  Shocks to dollarization ratio (FX/M2Y) have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on P in the first 29 months.  The largest 
statistically significant impact on P occurs after 29 months: a 1 percent standard deviation 
shock to FX/M2Y increases P by around 2 percent. 
The effect of FX/M2Y shock has the largest statistically significant impact on PSP 
after 17 months: a 1 percent standard deviation shock to FX/M2Y increases PSP by around 2 
percent.  After 17 months, the effect of the FX/M2Y impulse on PSP becomes statistically 
insignificant.  Shocks to FX/M2Y have a positive and statistically significant impact on EX in 
the first 22 months and thereafter they are statistically insignificant.  The largest statistically 
significant impact takes place after 7 months: a 1 percent standard deviation shock to 
FX/M2Y increases EX by around 2.9 percent.   
The results also indicate that shocks to FX/M2Y have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on MB after 1 month and 3 months.  The effect of the FX/M2Y impulse on 
MB turns positive and statistically significant after 8 months and remains so until 33 months, 
after which they become statistically insignificant.  The largest statistically significant impact 
takes place after 33 months: a 1 percent standard deviation shock to FX/M2Y increases MB 






                                                 
27 Since the variables are in logs, the impulse responses have the interpretation of cumulative growth rates relative to base. 
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Response of FX/M2Y to FX/M2Y
 
The results from variance decompositions
28 suggest that, over a 36-month horizon, 
38.3 percent of the forecast error variance of P can be accounted by shocks to FX/M2Y.
29 
                                                 
28 The forecast error variance decomposition indicates the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its “own” 
shocks versus shocks to the other variables.  The overall results of this exercise are reported in the Appendix. 
  20FX/M2Y shocks contribute roughly 34 percent, 44 percent, and 30 percent of the forecast 
error variances of PSP, EX, and MB respectively over a 36-month horizon.  The results also 
indicate that FX/M2Y explains nearly 61 percent of its forecast error variance, lending 
support to notion of the hysteresis also observed in other countries (Guidotti and Rodriguez 
1992).  
All in all, the response of the variables involved in the inflation dynamics in Turkey to 
shocks to FX/M2Y appears to confirm the results of the previous studies.  In response to 
innovations in FX/M2Y, MB declines initially as the public switches from domestic to foreign 
money holdings.  However, the monetary base increases after 5 months to generate the 
required inflation tax for a given budget deficit.   
The increase in PSP in response to FX/M2Y shocks suggests that the fiscal authority 
tries to compensate part of the decline in inflation tax through raising administered prices.  As 
expected, the exchange rate responds positively to shocks to dollarization owing to high 
elasticity of substitution—a finding in line with the previous studies (Selçuk 1997 and Akçay 
et. al. 1997). 
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper aimed to accomplish two goals.  First, it intended to provide a brief 
description of the main macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting the evolution of the 
dollarization process in Turkey.  Second, it aimed to empirically investigate the importance of 
dollarization in the dynamics of inflation. 
The results from the descriptive analysis suggest that, in addition to high inflation and 
economic instability, institutional factors also played an important role in the evolution of 
dollarization in Turkey.  More specifically, the liberalization of the financial system and the 
                                                                                                                                                          
29  The findings also suggest that P explains over 60 percent of its forecast error variance—a finding highlighting the 
importance of the inertia in inflation. 
  21emergence of new financial instruments as well as capital account liberalization contributed to 
the upward trend in foreign currency deposits since the mid-1980s.  In addition, policy 
decisions pertaining to reserve requirements, withholding tax rates, and resource utilization 
deductions appear to have played some role in affecting the dollarization process. 
In an attempt to empirically investigate the importance of dollarization in the 
dynamics of inflation in Turkey, the paper employed a recent technique introduced by Peseran 
and Shin (1998), referred to as generalized impulse response analysis. Unlike the traditional 
impulse response analysis, this approach does not require orthogonalization of shocks and is 
invariant to the ordering of the variables in the vector autoregression (VAR).   
The empirical results underscore the importance of dollarization in the dynamics of 
inflation in Turkey.  The findings are consistent with the view that shocks to dollarization lead 
to an increase in the monetary base to produce the required inflation tax for a given budget 
deficit.   Moreover, the results imply that the decline in inflation tax, which occurs as the 
public switches from domestic to foreign money holdings, is in part compensated by increases 
in administered prices.  In line with the results of the previous studies, the findings also 
highlight that the exchange rate responds positively to dollarization shocks owing to the high 
elasticity of substitution. 
The fact that an increase in dollarization affects the evolution of inflation adversely 
suggests that the decline in dollarization would have a favorable impact on the dynamics of 
inflation.  In light of the experience of other countries with dollarization, however, it is clear 
that this general policy implication does not translate into simple policy prescriptions.   
Evidence suggests that dollarization displays irreversibility (hysteresis), i.e. dollarization 
ratios do not decline even after the local currencies have been successfully stabilized and 
financial markets have deepened due to switching costs and long-lasting memories.
30  In 
                                                 
30 See Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2001), Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), and Dornbusch et. al. 
(1990) for more on this. 
  22addition, it is argued that hysteresis can take place even when the memory of past 
macroeconomic imbalances diminishes, if the expected volatility of inflation remains high in 
relation to that of the real exchange rate.
31 
In this regard, inflation targeting emerges as an interesting policy option.  This policy 
framework could be considered to limit dollarization since it would amount to a higher 
exchange rate volatility relative to price volatility.
32 Indeed, evidence suggests that inflation-
targeting countries experienced a decline in the pass-through from the exchange rate to 
prices.
33  This, in turn, implies that there may be scope for increasing the volatility of the real 
exchange rate without raising that of inflation, which could render inflation targeting as a 
promising policy framework for limiting dollarization.  This proposition, in turn, calls for a 




                                                 
31 See, for instance, Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998). 
32 Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998), drawing upon minimum variance portfolio equlibria, shows that for a given variance of 
inflation, an increase in the variance of the rate of depreciation reduces dollarization since it limits the hedging benefits of 
dollar assets. 
33 See Corbo et. al. (2001) for an assessment of inflation targeting.  
  23Appendix: Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
 
Table A1: Percentage of the Variance of Prices Explained by 
Months      Prices  Base Money  Exchange Rate Public Prices FX/M2Y 
6 0.7628  0.0282  0.5743 0.3255 0.1643 
12 0.7068  0.0309  0.5610 0.2801 0.2207 
24 0.6591  0.0299  0.5050 0.2718 0.3180 
36 0.6213  0.0274  0.4599 0.2877 0.3884 
 
 
Table A2: Percentage of the Variance of Base Money Explained by 
Months  Prices  Base Money  Exchange Rate Public Prices FX/M2Y 
6 0.1872  0.7728  0.1332 0.1383 0.0667 
12 0.4274  0.4573  0.2997 0.1786 0.0955 
24 0.5381  0.2431  0.3832 0.1958 0.2008 
36 0.5529  0.1694  0.3859 0.2243 0.2942 
 
 
Table A3: Percentage of the Variance of Exchange Rate Explained by 
Months  Prices  Base Money  Exchange RatePublic Prices FX/M2Y 
6 0.2319  0.0016  0.8431 0.1481 0.2472 
12 0.3151  0.0013  0.7803 0.1674 0.3132 
24 0.3756  0.0038  0.6788 0.2112 0.3920 
36 0.3962  0.0058  0.6046 0.2449 0.4361 
 
 
Table A4: Percentage of the Variance of Public Prices Explained by 
Months  Prices  Base Money  Exchange Rate Public Prices FX/M2Y 
6 0.3857  0.0051  0.8385 0.6819 0.1432 
12 0.4522  0.0045  0.8516 0.5919 0.1961 
24 0.5115  0.0080  0.7691 0.5021 0.2773 
36 0.5244  0.0108  0.6819 0.4606 0.3406 
 
 
Table A5: Percentage of the Variance of FX/M2Y Explained by 
Months  Prices  Base Money  Exchange Rate Public Prices FX/M2Y 
6 0.0231  0.0543  0.1026 0.0342 0.9456 
12 0.0165  0.0392  0.0625 0.0636 0.8062 
24 0.0108  0.0284  0.0409 0.1013 0.6505 
36 0.0097  0.0260  0.0363 0.1198 0.6081 
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